Racionalidad, instituciones y arenas de acción

René  Millán

doi:10.35305/rr.v2i4.65

Authors

René Millán Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35305/rr.v2i4.65

Keywords:

Action arenas, Common goods, Expectations, Institutions, Rational choice

Abstract

Rational choice theory is today the most influential analytical reference in the social sciences, but many of its assumptions are considered inappropriate and debated. This criticism has given rise to conceptions that have adjusted the theory's parameters. This paper argues that Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, and the concept of action arenas it implies, are extremely useful in the face of the deficits of that theory. To this end, it analyzes, first, the primary and controversial assumptions of rational choice theory. Second, according to the prisoner's dilemma, it identifies the tension between traditional individual rationality and public goods in terms of game theory. It shows its predictive difficulties and especially the central role of institutions in resolving the apparent paradox that the dilemma implies. Finally, I analyze the structure of action arenas in order to confirm their conceptual usefulness for understanding behavioral diversity, the possibility of joint solutions to common problems and the complex link between institutions and rationality.

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Author Biography

René Millán, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

El autor agradece a la UNAM y a Conacyt el apoyo para realizar este artículo.

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