In order to grasp how we have got there we need, however, to understand the disappointments of most people today as well as the role of such extreme-right forces in relation to democracy and often as protest movements.

The contemporary emergence of the extreme-right

There are many ways to look into the new movements and governments characterized by extreme-right features. Some views would simply affirm a continuity between twentieth century fascism (and even Latin American and southern European military regimes) and new movements and governments. This has not been however well-argued and what we do find is usually a more systematic refusal to simply accept a direct link between them, although there are obvious lines of continuity (Traverso, 2017). In any case, neither these movements nor regimes can be easily fit into the fascist model: neither is their mass basis the petty bourgeoisie, nor even the statist and economic nationalist character of fascism is there to be seen (Mann, 2004; Poulantzas, [1970] 1974; Paxton, 2004). To be sure, nationalism, as against foreigners and especially against Muslins -and sometimes Jews-, comes up time and again in Europe, while a xenophobic atmosphere can be found also in movements elsewhere, with the Muslim trope remaining prominent. Neoliberalism is, on the other hand, present in several of such movements which can be, at times, concerned with the well-being of the working classes and the re-built of some sort of Welfare State that would care exclusively for “nationals” but reach out to those left out among them. There is no homogeneity in this respect.

Another way of looking at them is through the lens of populism (Diehl, 2001; Mudde, 2010). The problem is that this is such an elusive definition that it is even difficult to take stock of, and even more apply it properly to, a specific case. There is so much variation in the concept and in the correspondence between it and reality that drawing upon any of its variants in my view simply just does not pay off. To be sure, demagoguery is a feature of extreme-right discourses, but this is not a characteristic that only belongs to them. At the same time, irrationalism, fake news, the lack of commitment to truth, some sort of putative Gramscian strategy to wage cultural wars as well as a damning good way to use the internet and social media have been distinguished features of such movements, which have enlisted a significant amount of militancy (Metz & Seelen, 2018; Taguief, 2012; Boltanski & Esquerre, 2014; Nagle, 2017; Herman & Muldoon, 2019).

More promising seems to be the definition of the extreme-right of the present as a protest movement or, even more broadly, as a regressive sort of social movement, although some people may simply deeply believe in their values and proposals. Yet against neo-liberalism and social exclusion, with the shaming inequalities that do not stop to grow in the late decades across the planet, allegiance to such movements may stem from understandable grounds but in any case would be an inappropriate and reactionary answer to the feelings of abandonment experienced today by so many working-class people as well as by part of the middle-classes (Heitmeyer, 2018; Koppetsch, 2019). They are, nevertheless, we can add, also a protest against the increasing oligarchization of political systems, the slow but relentless construction of advanced liberal oligarchy (in which parts of the upper middle classes and evidently the rich are doing very well). Feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness are then answered with the worse modern societies and human beings in general can produce: exclusivism, selfishness and prejudice, whereby reembeddings of disembedded people -processes typical of modernity- assume defensive and frequently horrendous features, landing them in right-wing identities and at least the occasional choice of reactionary, anti-egalitarian and anti-freedom politics2.

Of course, those extreme-right forces are neither democratic nor democratizing, pace their demagogic rhetoric: on the contrary, they can be agents that further the deepening oligarchization of contemporary political systems and may also shield capitalists, big corporations and finance capital as well as the well-off. Note however that, as Trotsky ([1932] 2007:19-20) realized in the 1930s, these movements have, at least to a large extent, a plebeian character (although people from the upper classes are surely involved), discursively posited against the rich and powerful, traditional party leadership and the like. Again, especially when in power, they do not necessarily pursue policies that favour working classes, the poor and plebeians.

Often, a highly personalistic sort of politics is played out by the extreme-right. Actually, personalization is a characteristic that pervades liberal political systems. Whereas liberal aspirations ideally evacuated modern political systems of the personal elements associated with the rule of the one (such as in European absolutism) in practice, some level of personalization, sometimes very high, never disappeared. Concreteness (which returns in the development of the modern political dimension) re-emerges with a vengeance also within political systems themselves, as we have known at least since Marx’s discussion of Bonapartism (Marx, [1852] 1960; Domingues, 2019b). Populism expresses this very directly (but then too much has to be brought into this vague concept, from Perón to Thatcher and beyond) (Germani, 1965; Hall, 1988). Not all extreme-right movements count and/or bet on that, but a few do. All things considered, such movements have moreover not broken with liberal political systems, although they may attack some elements of the liberal infrastructure, including aspects of the law, and of liberal democracy, searching for legitimation on the basis of what Schmitt ([1928] 1993:204-220) defined as representation through direct identification, in a sort of plebiscitary mechanism (which would not need to be specified). The closure of the political system, with a combination of the rule of the few and of the one, under the disguise of the rule of many, may be -and has been- established or reinforced, with money playing an important role in the tortuous (s)election of rulers by the ruled in some instances.

Finally, let me bring up Adorno’s ([1967] 2019) lecture on the spectre of right wing extremist, a politically shrewd piece and unfortunately still valid today, although some adjustments in his marxist framework are necessary. In a sense, we could look backwards and say that he had summed up what these those many analysts have disassembled today. Adorno notes, resuming Marx’s discussion of developmental trends (Tendenzen), that such currents stem from the concentration of capital and the relative impoverishment of several social layers and the foreseeable “catastrophic breakdown” (Zusammenbruch) of capitalism (the petty bourgeoisie included, but not only, in the 1960s likewise the past) as well as of the blockage of democracy, which remains purely formal. It means that people are threatened but have no options to overcome this predicament. The problem is that a sort of psychological, unconscious displacement comes about. Right extremism is based on propaganda -as the ultimate privileging of means in relation to ends, which would become empty and irrelevant-, as well as on stupid and simple, but exhaustively repeated ideas. These get hardened the more implausible they become (again, this implausibility is repressed through some sort of not mentioned psychological mechanism). Right-wing extremism is demagogic and false in relation to democracy, which it hates, alongside intellectuals and reason, Jews and whatever escapes the nation-state, something that could not work already by then and, exactly because of that, becomes fetishized (though I must stress that Adorno did not at all grasp the emancipatory push of nationalism in the periphery). Communists, which were not such a strong possibility in the 1920s-1930s in Germany and by the time he gave his lecture meant nothing in the Federal Republic in the 1960s, were also a sort of a scapegoat for such twisted perspectives. Such ideology contains elements of truth, which become false due to their entanglement with absurdities. While the breakdown of capitalism is unlikely to come about, at least the way Adorno seems to suggest, there is little in his statements that would not apply to contemporary societies, especially the malaise and personal insecurity that bedevils almost every single soul today.

Can we speak, beyond authoritarian inclinations, and sometimes assaults against the liberal institutional framework, of a new sort of regime? I doubt that: it is rather a disguised form of advanced oligarchy that has come into play, whether rather undemocratic liberal or tendentially illiberal, as some may argue (Mounk, 2018). In other words, while the extreme-right may have to grapple with more deeply entrenched liberal systems, it may find room for less liberal strategies, which they are keen to further in an authoritarian way, beyond the imaginary and discourse, hence changing institutional elements of the state and the law, as well as influencing society at large. When and whether we cannot speak of even advanced liberal oligarchies is an open question, to start with Russia since the 1990s, where liberal democracy has never set roots, even though we can hardly point to a dictatorial regime there, despite the role of vigilance and repression, as well as of personalization and strong autocratic features.

In Latin America, where, in spite of the democratic push of the 1980s-2000s, oligarchic features of political systems, often strongly coupled with widespread state neopatrimonial elements, stand out, the problem is not different, even when left-wing forces have come to power (and have tried to perpetuate themselves there, with recourse also to a radical personalization of politics). This does not mean that there are no opposing tendencies and trends at work. But especially in the case of Brazil a fierce right-wing government has come to the helm of the state. This has understandably awakened fears of a return to the not very distant past. Let us examine which past this is and what are the conditions of the country today, in order to assess which are the developmental possibilities in the political dimension.

The Brazil of Bolsonaro

The election of Jair Bolsonaro, a low level and extreme-right legislator, a fan of the military dictatorship, openly fascist, misogynist, racist and anti-communist, in the middle of a prolonged crisis of the Brazilian political system and society, has come as a shock to those that until very close to the end of the first round of the presidential election found it basically impossible to happen. His personal loose ideology and the amalgam derived from his alliances are a mix of the old right-wing, anti-communist perspectives of the military dictatorship he so much admires, the new global extreme-right irrationalism and the evangelical conservatism that made such powerful inroads in Brazilian society in the last decades, with its traditional family and heteronormative values, combined with a lar and order agenda and the adoption of social and economic neoliberal policies. Because of the radicalism of his discourse and its very sectional appeal, it seemed unlikely that he could win the elections, actually until the last months of the campaign. Many, like myself, thought the oligarchic groups that control the political system would be capable of holding the levers of power due to the reforms that strengthened their hands with lots of state money (once the Supreme Federal Tribunal -STF- prohibited private company money was used in electoral campaigns) and television time for electoral propaganda. The disgust of the Brazilian population against politicians found its way into the up to then unlikely victory of Bolsonaro, whose occasional party of choice (the Social Liberal Party -PSL-) was basically inexistence until that moment.

Bolsonaro drew upon the usual receipt of right-wing forces across the globe as of lately: intensive use of social media (illegally to a large extent, with lots of robots outside the country) and fake news, with a discourse very much against the left and the Workers’ Party (PT), as well as the support of the US extreme-right (including Steve Bannon) (Solano Gallego, 2019). Lower-rank officers in the armed forces pushed their superiors towards Bolsonaro and he enjoyed concentrated evangelical support, while voting across classes, with a predominance of the well-off and in the South and Southeast, guaranteed his electoral majority. Yet, to reduce Bolsonaro’s victory to his communication strategy or to a supposed anti-poor bias, and above all to the use of fake news, as the PT oligarchic ruling group does, including seemingly Lula da Silva, is really disingenuous. It entirely misses the point and opens room for subsequent defeats in the years to come.

The crisis of the political system started in 2013, when massive demonstrations, which brought together, implying also conflicts, people of all political persuasions, while too many social demands went on unmet after more than a decade of centre-left governments. It expanded relentlessly afterwards (Domingues, 2015 and 2017; Carvalho, 2018). The revelation of far-reaching corruption schemes by the most important political forces, from the centre-right, centre and centre-left then wrought havoc, with the judiciary -through the Car-Wash operation- performing in a sort of bonapartist way. Prosecutors and judges took advantage of and contributed to the deepening political crisis and the in-fighting of the political oligarchies, traditional and new alike (the PT’s machine had by this time taken an entrenched taste for power, its props and perks), which were at each other’s throat in a factional way typical of oligarchic political systems. Meanwhile the economic crisis that gained traction in 2015, especially after Dilma Rousseff be­trayed her electoral promises and adopted recessive policies, which, along with the desperation of politicians for someone that would help them get off the hook, led to her impeachment, on (at best) very dubious legal premises and partly in a revengeful mood. Her impeachment represented a parliamentary coup by congresspeople in search of self-protection against the advances of the Car Wash (Lava-Jato) judiciary operations against corruption. It was eventually supported by business, which already wanted the implementation of a radical neoliberal agenda (Domingues, 2017).

Lula da Silva, the former president, who had become the fiduciary authority of the political system, with its corrupted schemes, simultaneously with being the most popular politician in the country among the poor, was jailed (though it is doubtful whether he would be capable of getting elected as his supporters claim). In turn, the Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), for two decades already a neoliberal, faintly social liberal centre-right formation, was even more profoundly affected by the corruption scandals than even the in practice more social liberal PT, its main contender from the 1990s to the mid-2010s. Finally, the centrist and extremely patrimonialist Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), to which the vicepresident Michel Temer belonged, and who took over after Rousseff’s fall and is now being prosecuted- was overwhelmed, alongside similar parties to the centre and centre-right of the political spectrum, by the same succession of corruption scandals. This was the window that allowed for Bolsonaro’s victory, after he was unexpectedly stabbed by a crazy man with a left-wing background.

It is necessary here to pause for a moment to reconsider and elaborate on the notion of political system adumbrated above (see, again, Domingues, 2019a & 2019b). It has two sides, a state-based and societal one. While the mediation between the population and the state political system, through in part the societal political system, is surely very important, their own internal dynamics, especially that of the state political system, must be accounted for. Therein lies, to a large extent, the oligarchic character of the system, which frequently blocks off even the participation of those who take part in the societal political system, let alone the population as a whole. This is what underwent such a deep crisis. Formerly the armed forces played Pretorian roles, in Latin America as elsewhere in the world (Marx, [1852] 1960 & Huntington [1968] 2006, 4, 47–50, 79), but now the judiciary partly assumed this role, inspired also by the Italian Mani Pulite operation, further propelling the crisis of the political system of which it had in the first place taken advantage to push through its anti-corruption agenda. Many have attempted to explain the downfall of Rousseff and the judiciary procedures that led Lula da Silva to prison mentioning supposed conspiracies by US imperialism, the desire to take over the Brazilian pre-Sal oil and similar things, as well as the putative hatred of the rich and particularly the middle classes of the poor. Although, however, they have been especially tough with the PT and the upper-echelons of the judiciary have clearly been protecting centre-right politicians (but also, when possible, PT’s Congressmen and women), it is patently the impossibility of keeping the usual workings of the political system, in the face of multifaceted and pervasive popular dissatisfaction, that has led to the disorganization of the system. If Bolsonaro was never an outsider, his subaltern position within the political system lent credibility to his claim of not being part of it, alongside his clearly plebeian background and carefully crafted discourse. This was just a natural successor to Lula’s poor man’s personal outlook and public demeanour. His share of the electorate in 2018 largely demonstrates this, with a powerful show in the periphery of the big cities, where the Evangelical churches are extremely strong, although he was initially less popular in the northeast and with blacks and women and in the southeast, with his supporters showing some less commitment to democracy (Tavares de Almeida & Guarnieri, 2020; Cardoso, 2020; Nicolau, 2020).

As pointed out, personally Bolsonaro could be easily deemed a fascist, Brazilian style, with solid connections with the most right-wing elements (the “mad dogs”, so to speak) of the military dictatorship, torturers and others of their ilk. Therefore, the state and the armed forces (usually almost nothing of a fascist movement) play a key role in this perspective. Moreover, he and his politically active sons -fundamental in his broader movement at present- entertain close links with the global right but also with the criminal militias that plague Rio de Janeiro. These are made above all of policemen (though firemen play a part in it too) who exploit, prostitution, gambling, illegal cable TV, gas, drugs and many other activities, including the killing of “unwanted” elements and of their “enemies” (drug dealers particularly, whose territory they want to take over). Among the former, for still obscure reasons, we find the murdered councilwoman Marielle Franco. Yet Bolsonaro’s government is not a fascist one, though he would surely like to get rid of the democratic features of Brazilian liberal democracy and introduce a sort of revised authoritarian regime, with open autocratic features. Let us look a bit more closely into that.

The 1960s-1980s were characterized in Brazil, as much as in other South Cone countries of the La tin America, by what O’Donnell (1973, 1982) defined as an authoritarian bureau­cratic regime at the centre of which was the army, though businessmen had a crucial role in it too. We can say it had fascist features (especially regarding the role of the political police), but it was mainly the bureaucratic structure of the armed forces that served as its organizational pillar, while anti-communism lied at the core of its ideology. Is there a possibility of Brazil returning to such a regime? I think this is very unlikely. What is possible -though the present general crisis makes it less likely or sustainable- is the development of what I have defined as advanced liberal oligarchy 2: most of the explicit elements of the liberal infrastructure remain in place, elections are held, public debate may be more or less open, but repression, surveillance, some censorship and more generally authoritarianism unfold, supported by extreme-right activity in social media, alongside neoliberal reforms, which are demanded especially by finance capital but also by the upper classes in general, including the liberal press and liberal politicians (like Rodrigo Maia, of Democrats -DEM-, a centre-right party, who was during the years 2019-2020 president of chamber of deputies and played an absolutely instrumental part in passing many key reforms, though he also opposes Bolsonaro’s more authoritarian moves).

Right now, Brazil does not have a completely extreme-right government, Bolsonaro’s moves have been blocked, but if consolidated he may turn it into that, strengthening the most oligarchic and repressive features of advanced liberal oligarchy. Actually, this looks much more like the frustrated project of self-reformation of the military regime in the 1980s, before its defeat, than like a return to the past. We must add to this the even more extreme conservatism, in terms of mores, of evangelical (especially Pentecostal) churches in Brazil (likewise in the US) and the irrationalism of putative intellectuals (such as the bizarre Olavo de Carvalho) who got to the point of embracing the flat earth trope (though surely the smartest of them play a game using this with others who are truly the fools). Very central for the government (mirroring the Philippines) is also the law-and-order approach (generally and in particular vis-à-vis corruption, despite serious inconsistencies when it comes to Bolsonaro’s sons and the government) of which Justice Minister Sérgio Moro, the popular Car Wash judge, is the main expression. Tough on crim­e and soft with guns and violence against criminals: this is a widespread perspective in Brazil today, including among the poor, who seem to be tired of criminality. Note in particular that order and state legitimacy are very dear to the military (a topic in which Rosenfield (2018) is an argumentative right-wing exponent) with the Bolsonaro government purportedly standing up for them.

Besides, in order for Brazil to jump into a regime change oriented towards a bureaucratic authoritarian, let alone a fascist regime stout social support would be needed as well as that of the army. This does not exist, as it became clear in the course of 2020, though he has, with a military crisis in May 2021, advanced over its command, which he substituted. It is true that there is now an open and vociferous extreme-right in Brazil. Also true is Bolsonaro’s support by around 30 percent of the electorate (always polarizing the political process and working hard to keep this level of backing) and that the armed forces maintain now a strong dislike of the left. At the same time, until at least the beginning of 2020, Bolsonaro tried to rule by sowing chaos, through provocations and a permanent sort of campaign, in order to keep his amount of support firm, though it is also clear that as to governing he has a much more destructive plan in mind (Nobre, 2019). This is however as yet not the same as a clear support for regime change, a so-called self-coup. Business, which largely upheld Bolsonaro and carries on upholding his economic agenda, is likewise unlike to back such sort of adventure. This is bound to end up badly and, in any case, would be very costly, especially at the global level, for the country. Actually, there seems to be no reason for such a disruptive move. Besides, now controlled by the centre-right, Congress is doing a good job in what regards further neoliberal reforms.

In sum, if politics has its own dynamic and must be analyzed in partial independence from other social processes, concretely this is only relative, though it must never be treated as a dependent variable. Bear in mind furthermore that, although this is a neoliberal government in many respects, Bolsonaro had never been associated to this credo. He can change his tack and, if in particular labour law and retirement schemes have become much worse for workers, social liberalism, as we can see with recent developments of the Bolsa Familia cash transfer scheme, remains in place and might even turn to be more encompassing in order to propel his popularity and try to erase the left3.

All this said, it was clear that in the beginning of 2020 Bolsonaro was not doing bad. His strategy of polarization seemed to work and, although the economy did not take off, it was not as bad. Bolsonaro was then hit by the coronavirus crisis, with its attendant health and economic implications (see Domingues, 2021). He fought against social distancing, defended by his health minister and all governors in the country. He dragged his feet until accepting the need to hand out cash to informal workers and workers unemployed or with partial salary reduction as well as to business, while his extremely neoliberal minister (Paulo Guedes) tried to deny the depth of impending crisis. Denial of science, a concern with an economic recession which might (two years later, in 2022) prevent his re-election and an imitation of Donald Trump’s initial negative response to coronavirus guided Bolsonaro to a deadlock from which he decided not to try to escape. Losing popularity, he fired the minister while of health and, because the investigation of his sons by the Federal Police, Moro clashed with him over the forced change of its head, leading to a further fall of rates of approval (although Moro himself has dodged the recognition of the crimes committed by Bolsonaro and his sons). While a typical extreme-right perspective on science came to the fore in his positioning, a crude and callous sort of not only economic but also biological Darwinism (the weak die and life carries on) surfaced too, along with a shallow military mentality (in all wars there are casualties).

Talk of impeachment has become widespread and it has indeed for the first time a real possibility. Instead of searching for accommodation, Bolsonaro has however more openly attacked Congress and the STF, radicalizing political conflict. At the same time, he decided to strike a deal with the centrão (the big centre) in Congress, a usually corrupt group of politicians, who have been regularly involved in brutal scandals, while his economy minister resists the emergency Keynesianism the crisis has globally elicited. The political crisis is certain to keep developing and mounting. It has become harder for Bolsonaro to finish his government, whereas fascist groups have been organizing in society and it is not totally clear whether the armed forces, always evoked by Bolsonaro, would support him if push comes to shove, though they would more likely remain neutral.

Bolsonaro’s popularity has wavered, as it did in the first months of 2020 due to the worse­ning of the sanitary and economic situation, without emergency cash for a few months. This does not mean that he is no longer a main competitor in the 2022 elections, especially since the emergency cash has now returned and the pandemic is most likely to be under control and economic growth return in 2022. Moreover, if Bolsonaro loses these elections he will surely denounce an inexistent fraud and will not leave power peacefully.

This leads us to a discussion of what we can expect of the democratic opposition, including the role of a social agenda. We need in addition to go further and inquire into the other social and political elements that have been fast developing in Brazilian society and may lead to a renewal of democracy and democratic thinking.

Democracy, opposition and the future of Brazil (and of the world)

Opposition to Bolsonaro had thus far been largely ineffective. He seemed to become stronger and stronger. This has not yet been discarded, but if it occurs it will be in another register.

Students and university professors took to the streets in 2019 and conservative liberals (many of whom supported Bolsonaro in the second round of the 2018 elections) resisted his advances, along with the press with a similar doctrinal angle, blocking some of his excesses, while the latter have also supported his neoliberal reforms. The left has courageous parliamentarians, who have played an important role in denouncing and articulating resistance against Bolsonaro. But unions and similar left movements are paralyzed. The very strategy of democratic forces and, especially, of the left against the degradation of liberal democracy in Brazil has not been consensual. Some have argued for a democratic front against Bolsonaro’s “fascist” or at least “authoritarian” plans. Others prefer to bet on a narrower left front. Finally, especially since he left prison, Lula da Silva and most of the PT have emphasized their usual choice: to be the absolute protagonists of politics in general and, particularly, of electoral processes, as if nothing new was happening in Brazil and in the world. The centre, for its part, was seriously injured in the 2018 elections and is still in its initial efforts to reorganize itself. It is gradually re-emerging.

The main issue for the left, despite Bolsonaro’s thus far changed position, remains the same: how to assemble a democratic front against the extreme-right, although the left is unlikely to profit from it in the short or even the medium-run. At this point Brazil suffers under a mix of extreme-right government and oligarchic politics. While, therefore, keeping the democratic front is crucial for left politics, at the same time a more radical democratic and socially-oriented programme must also be put forward by the left, in itself plural, so that it keeps its identity and has its proper agenda in this case against the liberal opposition, which in this regard often sides with Bolsonaro. Overlapping systems of alliance are required in this regard, although the Left is rather lost and practically blocked, as well as very divided.

Other processes have been however developing, which most politicians and even intellectuals have enormous difficulty to grasp. To some extent in Latin America, it started in 2001 in Argentina with its que se vayan todos, but its landmark was the 2013 demonstrations, a true explosion, in Brazil (Domingues, 2015). Since then, eruptions of citizens dissatisfied and disgusted with the political system have been regular across the subcontinent, likewise other regions of the globe. This includes those in which the target may be the left, as in Bolivia, with the disrespect for the Constitution showed by Evo Morales and his party and subsequent straightforward electoral fraud, or in Chile, against the whole political system, both in 2019. Usually, people want to read a rejection pure and simple of neoliberalism in such demonstrations and insurrections, something maybe truer in some cases, for instance in Ecuador, also in 2019 and partly obviously in the Chilean case (but as well in 2013 Brazil vis-à-vis the weak social liberal reformism of Lula da Silva and Rousseff).

Yet the main and direct target has been the oligarchic character of state political systems (that may extend into the societal political system in particular if left parties colonize it through prebendal offers and interventionist moves to secure control and support) and the exclusion of citizens from political processes as well as from the often-sumptuous settings and workings of the system. Social autonomization of agents, with the disappearance or weakening of the mediating forces that were paradoxically linked to democratization, though they were themselves rather oligarchic (such as unions and other movements), has led to this transformed situation (Domingues, 2019a). There is no way back from it. Individualized mass social media has been also playing a key part in the furthering of this social fluidity and new forms of mobilization.

This sort of mass mobilization may re-emerge in Brazil at any moment, although it looks unlikely at this precise point, especially since an increasingly extreme-right government furnishes the focus of political struggle. In the long run, this is a plebeian promise of democratization, regardless of whether such moves are capable of breaking through the armature of the political system, something which the 2013 explosions failed to achieve. It is not a matter of absolutizing it, since without parties and the like it is impossible to operate especially in the state political system. It is important however to democratize these parties, still in the course of the resistance against the extreme-right, such as is the case in Brazil today. Besides, innovative programmes relating to climate change, radical changes in capitalism and labour, social welfare, etc. are necessary, beyond conventional policies and politics, re-engaging workers and plebeians overall, the youth and women (Domingues, 2020). We have a long way ahead in order to be able to respond to these needs adequately. This may discourage many, but may also be seen as an opportunity for creative politics, in which resuming and deepening democracy must have priority, starting with a broad democratic front against the extreme-right, whether or not we believe it may establish a “fascist” government or “simply” a very repressive and controlling new sort of oligarchic regime. This exceeds the Brazilian situation, surely, consisting in a global issue, but assumes, in the face of recent political developments, specific features there. We need to be attentive to both. Besides, the next years are bound to be marked by a deep, economic and social as well as possibly political, crisis, with perhaps unforeseeable consequences.

With Lula’s absolutely likely candidacy, after his trials were annulled in the STF in March 2021, the scenario obviously changes. He, who has always refused a politics of democratic front, could supposedly individually defeat Bolsonaro in 2022. Once again, Lula and the PT most probably manage to impose themselves hegemonically on its political spectrum, and maybe even stall movements of renewal and change within the left and the centre-left. But it would be false to assume that, as he and his supporters apparently would like to believe, a return to 2002 is possible. This judicial change was pushed by STF’s Justice Gilmar Mendes (who had juridically vetoed Lula’s participation in the Rousseff’s government and clearly operates for the centre-right oligarchic sectors). He has now declared Moro’s suspicion in Lula’s case after the revelation, by the site Intercept, of inadequate conversations between the judge and the public prosecutors, with however a preemptive move by Justice Edson Fachin, who is more sympathetic towards the Lava-Jato operation and had annulled Moro’s ruling through a mere a change of jurisdiction (without cancelling former criminal procedures). What the final juridical consequences will be and what Mendes’ annulment means to the judiciary and the political system will be gradually revealed. In any case, a new conjuncture has opened, although Bolsonaro should not by no means be underestimated. Bolsonaro has moreover bent the army to his will, preventing his former health Minister, active army General Eduardo Pazuello, from being punished for taking part, with him, in a political demonstration. On the other had the Congress Inquiry Commission (CPI) installed to investigate the management of the pandemic has shown, if that was really needed, how reckless Bolsonaro and his government have behaved, whether or not this will have further legal and political consequences.

Let me finish resuming Adorno’s ([1967] 2019:54-55) lecture. Pretending to be smart or lying like right extremists do (whether they are true fascists or not) cannot, he argued, an adequate answer: instead, it is with the resounding power of reason, with its non-ideological truth, that the answer to the irrationalism and violence the extreme-right constantly mobilize should be given. It is false to ask about the future of right extremism, the extreme-right as I have named it here, as if it were a natural catastrophe, as nothing could do be done and resignation in the face of it was the only thing left. How it will develop and the responsibility for this depends on the social forces mobilized against it. The same applies however to the unprecedented social crisis Brazil will undergo in the next years and to the answers that shall be given to it.

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